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ABSTRACT
This paper also appears in the Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference o f the Cognitive 
Science Society, July 1987.
Recent explanation-based learning (EBL) models in AI allow a computer program to learn a 
schema by analyzing a single example. For example. GENESIS is an EBL system which learns a plan 
schema from a single specific instance presented in a narrative. Previous learning models in both AI 
and psychology have required multiple examples. This paper presents experimental evidence that 
people can learn a plan schema from a single narrative and that the learned schema agrees with that 
predicted by EBL. This evidence suggests that GENESIS, originally constructed as a machine learn­
ing system, can be interpreted as a psychological model of learning a complex schema from a single 
example.
* This research was supported in part by University of Illinois Cognitive Science/AI fellowships to the first two au­
thors and in part by the Office of Naval Research under gTant N-00014-86-K-0309.
Schema Acquisition from One Example
Introduction
Recent explanation-based models in machine learning (DeJong & Mooney, 1986; Mitchell. 
Keller. & Kedar-Cabelli, 1986) allow a program to learn a concept or schema by analyzing the 
causal structure of a single example. Explanation-based learning (EBL) systems construct an 
explanation for why an instance is a member of a concept or why a particular sequence of actions 
achieves a goal. This explanation is then generalized, retaining only the constraints required to 
maintain its causal structure. Mooney and Bennett (1986) review and compare a number of simi­
lar algorithms for performing this generalization. These algorithms produce a general concept 
description or plan schema which can be used to improve performance on future classification, 
understanding, or problem solving tasks.
A major difference between EBL and other approaches to learning is the number of examples 
required. Similarity-based learning (Michalski, 1983; Mitchell, 1978; Quinlan, 1986) requires 
many examples and systems based on analogy (Carbonell. 1983; Falkenhainer, Forbus. & Gentner, 
1986; Winston, 1980) require two examples, while EBL requires only a single example. Although a 
number of psychological experiments exist demonstrating people's ability to learn concepts or sche­
mata from two examples using analogy (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Spencer & Weisberg, 1986) or 
from many examples using similarity-based induction (Medin, Wattenmaker. & Michalski, 1986; 
Posner & Keele, 1968), there seems to be no experiments directed at demonstrating people’s ability 
to learn a concept or schema from a single example. Consequently, until now, there has been no 
empirical evidence to support the use of EBL as a psychological model of human learning. This 
paper summarizes a number of recently conducted experiments which demonstrate subjects' ability 
to learn a new general plan schema from a single narrative describing a specific instance of the plan. 
The schema acquired in this way is shown to obey the variables and constraints predicted by an
EBL model.
Schema Acquisition from One Example 
Learning from One Example in GENESIS
The idea of learning a schema by analyzing the explanation of a single narrative was first 
presented in (DeJong, 1981). The GENESIS system (Mooney. 1985; Mooney & DeJong. 1985) is a 
realization of this idea which processes short English narratives and is able to acquire new plan 
schemata from single specific instances.
During the understanding process. GENESIS attempts to construct explanations for characters' 
actions in terms of the goals their actions were meant to achieve. This process involves plan-based 
understanding mechanisms like those employed by previous narrative processing systems (Dyer. 
1983; Schank & Riesbeck, 1981; Wilensky, 1983). When the system observes that a character has 
achieved an interesting goal in a novel way. it generalizes the composition of actions the character 
used to achieve this goal into a new schema. The generalization process (described in Mooney and 
Bennett (1986)) consists of an analysis of the causal model of the narrative which removes 
unnecessary details while maintaining the validity of the explanation. The resulting generalized set 
of actions is then stored as a new schema and used by the system to correctly process narratives 
which were previously beyond its capabilities. Currently, GENESIS has learned schemata for 
kidnapping-for-ransom. arson-for-insurance. murder-for-inheritance. and for a police-officer 
impersonating a prostitute in order to entrap solicitors. In each of these cases, it demonstrates a 
performance improvement by using the schema it has learned to construct explanations for narra­
tives which it previously could not explain.
The goal of the present research is to show that GENESIS can be interpreted as a psychological 
model. Thus, we have carried out a series of experiments to see if people can acquire a novel plan 
schema from a narrative describing a single specific instance of a novel action. Specifically, we 
predicted that people would build a causally complete representation of the text by causally con­
necting instantiations of existing schemata (as in Johnson-Laird's mental model (1983) or van Dijk 
& Kintsch’s situation model (1983)). The explanation is the connected portion of the model which 
contributes to the characters achieving important goals. This explanation is immediately generalized
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into a schema by changing constants to variables within the constraint that the structure of the 
explanation remains intact. The resulting schema is characterized by a set of variables which are 
slots which can be filled by different objects or agents in each instance, and a set of constraints 
which specify necessary properties of variables and necessary relationships between variables. The 
constraints are those properties and relations required to maintain the causal validity of the expla­
nation.
Overview of the Experiments
GENESIS was originally constructed as a machine learning system. It was not explicitly writ­
ten to model an existing set of psychological data. In order to explore the validity of GENESIS as a 
psychological model of human learning, four psychological experiments were conducted. The basic 
design was to have subjects read a passage describing a specific instance of a novel plan. Each of the 
first three experiments used a different task to test whether or not subjects had acquired an abstract 
schema from this single example. The last experiment tested whether subjects generalized the nar­
rative as a natural part of comprehension or only produced the abstract schema when they were 
asked general questions about the narrative.
Three passages were constructed to present situations for which the subjects presumably did 
not already have a pre-established schema but which they could understand using aspects of their 
existing knowledge. For example, one passage involves a cooperative buying scheme used in other 
countries. In Korea the system is called a “Kyeah" and in India it is called a “chit fund“. The 
experimental narrative describing a single instance of this plan follows:
Tom, Sue, Jane, and Joe were all friends and each wanted to make a large purchase as soon as possi­
ble. Tom wanted a VCR, Sue wanted a microwave, Joe wanted a car stereo, and Jane wanted a com­
pact disk player. However, after paying their expenses, they each only had $60 left at the end of 
every third month. Tom, Sue, Jane, and Joe all got together to solve the problem. They made four 
slips of paper with the numbers 1,2,3, and 4 written on them. They put them in a hat and each 
drew out one slip. Jane got the slip with the 4 written on it, and said, "Oh darn, I have to wait to get 
my CD player." Joe got the slip with the 1 written on it and said, "Great, I can get my car stereo 
right away!" Sue got the number 2, and Tom got number 3. In February, they each contributed the 
$60 they had left. Joe took the whole $240 and bought a Pioneer car stereo at K’s Merchandise. In 
May, they each contributed their money again. This time, Sue used the $240 to buy a Sharp 600 
watt 1.5 cubic foot microwave at K-mart. In August, all four again contributed $60. Tom took the 
money and bought a Sanyo Beta VCR with wired remote at Service Merchandise. In November, Jane
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got the money and bought a Technics CD player at Apple Tree Stereo.
The complexity of the experimental examples prevented a complete formal analysis and computer 
implementation. Therefore, constraints and variables were obtained for each schema by determin­
ing a set of roles for the schema and deciding which properties and relations of these roles were 
important in maintaining the underlying causal structure of the narrative. Variables and con­
straints were determined for each schema before conducting any of the experiments. Table 1 shows 
the list of variables and constraints identified for the Kyeah schema.
In addition to a group given specific narratives (Example group), experiments 2 and 3 also 
used a control group which was given abstract descriptions of the schemata underlying each of the 
example narratives (Abstract group). The description of the Kyeah schema given to the Abstract 
group follows:
Suppose there are a number of people (let the number be n) each of whom wants to make a large 
purchase but does not have enough cash on hand. They can cooperate to solve this problem by each 
donating an equal small amount of money to a common fund on a regular basis. (Let the amount 
donated by each member be m.) They meet at regular intervals to collect everyone’s money. Each 
time money is collected, one member of the group is given all the money collected (n X m) and then 
with that money he or she can purchase what he or she wants. In order to be fair, the order in 
which people are given the money is determined randomly. The first person in the random ordering 
is therefore able to purchase their desired item immediately instead of having to wait until they 
save the needed amount of money. Although the last person does not get to buy their item early, 
this individual is no worse off than they would have been if they waited until they saved the mo­
ney by themselves.
Since subjects in the Abstract group had been directly told the content of the schema, they were 
presumed to have learned the schema. Consequently, if the Example group performed as well as 
the Abstract group on a task requiring knowledge of the general schema, then it is reasonable to
Table 1: Variables and Constraints for the Kyeah Schema
Variables Constraints
identity of participants 
number of participants (n) 
exact time of meetings 
interval between meetings (t) 
amount of donation (m) 
items bought
stores where items bought 
method of determining order
participants want items of similar value 
participants cannot afford items 
participants trust each other 
participants can afford m each t 
each participant donates same amount 
cost of desired items — n X m 
number of meetings = number of participants 
order must be assigned randomly
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assume that the subjects in the Example group had also acquired the schema.
In addition to the Kyeah schema, the other two situations used in the experiments included a 
technique for making additional money by fencing copies of a stolen collectable and a confidence 
game called the “phony bank-examiner ploy” (the latter was taken from Wharton (1967)). None 
of the experiments found appreciable differences among the three schemata; consequently, the 
results reported for each experiment are averaged across all three examples.
In all of the experiments, the Example group was given only a single instance of the schema. 
Thus any learning that occurred in this group would be outside the domain of learning theories 
which required multiple instances (i.e. analogy or similarity-based induction).
In order to determine whether a learned schema agreed with that predicted by EBL, subjects’ 
learning was always judged on how well they obeyed the constraints and recognized the mutability 
of the variables.
Subjects in all of the experiments were undergraduate students at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign and participated in the experiments to fulfill a requirement of an introductory 
psychology course. After each of the experiments, subjects were asked whether they had previ­
ously heard of any of the three plans described in the passages. If so, their data were discarded.
Experiment 1: General Description Generation
In Experiment 1. in order to test whether subjects had acquired a schema from a single 
instance, we asked them to write a general description of the schema. We predicted that in the sub­
jects’ descriptions the schema constraints would remain but the actual objects in the story would 
be replaced with variables.
Method
The experiment used only one group of subjects. Each subject was given the three experimen­
tal narratives and was told for each one to “write, in abstract terms, a description of the general 
technique illustrated in the narrative.” In order to clarify the instructions, they were given a
-5-
Schema Acquisition from One Example
sample narrative and its corresponding general description. We included this demonstration narra­
tive to show subjects which level of abstraction we wanted them to generate. The demonstration 
narrative was about skyjacking and was selected to be unrelated to the experimental passages. The 
demonstration passages do not reveal which portions of the narratives are constraints and which 
are variables. For example, an airplane is mentioned in both the demonstration narrative and its 
corresponding general description; however, although a VCR is mentioned in the Kyeah narrative, it 
is not a part of the Kyeah schema. A correct analysis can only be determined by providing an 
explanation for the individual example.
After reading the instructions, all of the subjects read the first narrative and wrote a general 
description for it and did the same thing for the second and third story at their own pace. Data 
were collected from 11 subjects.
Results and Discussion
In general, subjects produced good schema descriptions. The following is the description of the 
Kyeah schema written by one subject:
Suppose in a group of people, each person would like to buy something expensive, but over a period 
of time, each person cannot earn enough to buy what he would like. By using random selection, each 
person could be assigned a number, when the group had saved enough money together to purchase 
an item, the person with the first number would get his item. This would continue for the rest of 
the group until everyone had gotten what he wished.
To provide a more objective index of the subjects’ performance, we counted the number of con­
straints mentioned and the number of variables identified in their general descriptions. A variable 
was considered to have been identified if either an abstract term, such as "group" or "something," 
was used to refer to it. or if it was simply not mentioned in the description. If a particular vari­
able is not mentioned at all, then it is reasonable to assume that the subjects believe that its partic­
ular value was not important to the overall schema.
On the average. 84% of the constraints were explicitly mentioned and 88% of the variables 
were identified. These percentages indicate that subjects can acquire an abstract schema from a sin­
gle instance and that the characteristics of the learned schema agrees with those predicted by EBL
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theory.
Experiment 2: Story Generation
In Experiment 2. we tested whether the schema that subjects acquired could deal with new 
instances. If both Example and Abstract groups could produce another instance equally well based 
on what they read, it would indicate that both groups had acquired a generative schema.
Method
Subjects in the Example group were given the three narratives and told for each one to "write 
another story in which characters use the general method illustrated in the story but that is other­
wise as different as possible." Subjects in the Abstract group were given the three abstract schema 
descriptions and told for each one to "write a story in which particular individuals use the tech­
nique described in the passage in a specific case." Both groups read their first passage and wrote a 
story and the task was repeated for the second and the third passages. There wdte eight subjects in 
the Example group and seven in the Abstract group.
Results and Discussion
In general, both groups produced equally good narratives. The following is the new Kyeah 
narrative written by one subject in the example condition.
Bill, Kim, John and Mary were all business associates. Bill wanted some land in Northern Illinois, 
Kim wanted a new house in Switzerland, John wanted a new Porshe 928S with all all accesories, 
and Mary wanted to take a trip around the world. The only problem was they each only had 
$25,000.00 left unspent at the end of each month. They all got together and picked random vari­
ables on Bill’s business computer. Mary was farthest from her variable so she would have to wait 
till last to get her trip around the world. John nailed his variable and jumped enthusiastically say­
ing, "Yea, I get to get my new Porshe 928S right now." They each talked with their banker and drew 
the $25 Thousand dollars out and pooled it together after the first month and the next day John 
drove up in Ihis new, black, 928S with all accessories. At the end of the next month they again 
pooled their money and Kim got her chalet in Switzerland. Again at the end of the next month they 
pooled their money an Bill got his land in Northern Illinois. Finally, after the fourth month they 
pooled their money together and Mary left for her trip around the world.
Again, to be more objective, we counted the number of constraints obeyed and the number of vari­
ables changed in the stories generated by the Example group. However, in the Abstract group, we 
could only count the number of constraints obeyed since there were no constants to change in their
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passages (e.g. number of participants, items purchased, etc.).
Overall, the Example group obeyed 90% of the constraints while the Abstract group obeyed 
87%. In addition, the Example group changed 71% of the variables. These results imply that from 
a single specific instance subjects can acquire a schema equivalent to that acquired directly from an 
abstract description of the schema.
Experiment 3: Yes/No Questions
Experiment 3 was designed to test whether subjects in both groups were equally good at 
detecting which portions of the narratives were variables and which were constraints. Although in 
Experiment 2. the Example group changed only 71% of the variables, this does not necessarily indi­
cate that they did not identify the rest of them. It is possible that the subjects simply did not take 
the effort to change the values of all of the variables. For example, most of the subjects did not 
change the number of participants in their Kyeah narratives. Experiment 3 directly tested the abil­
ity of subjects to recognize all of the variables.
Method
We developed a yes/no question for each constraint (for example, "Can some people con­
sistently donate less than others and have the system work?") and a yes/no question for each vari­
able (for example, "Is there any particular number of people required for this plan?"). For each 
question the expected answers based on EBL were sometimes "yes" and sometimes "no". Both the 
Example and Abstract groups read their first passage, answered the same questions with "yes" or 
no", and justified their answers. Then they did the same thing for the second and the third passage 
at their own pace. There were ten subjects in the Example group and seven in the Abstract group.
Results and Discussion
The data supported our prediction that the Example group would perform as well as the 
Abstract group. The average percent correct for the Example group was 83% while that for the 
Abstract group was 81%. For constraints, the scores were 84% and 81% for the Example and
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Abstract groups, respectively. For variables, the scores were 80% and 81%, respectively.
Also, we examined the subjects’ justifications for incorrect answers and found that most of 
their "errors" were not due to the subjects’ failure to generalize in an explanation-based manner, 
but were due to the subjects’ generating a schema slightly different from the one we had attempted 
to embody in the text. Some of the questions made certain underlying assumptions about the execu­
tion of the plan which could be relaxed to generate an even more general schema. Among those 
answers marked as incorrect, 87% of the Example group’s justifications and 79% of the Abstract 
group’s justifications presented arguments which were based on a causally consistent interpretation 
of the schema. For example, given the following question: "In the above plan, is it necessary that 
the number of meetings be the same as the number of people in the group?", one subject responded: 
"No. it’s irrelevant. They could collect money every week and then at the end of the month the 
one person gets it all." An example of a causally inconsistent justification is when a subject was 
asked: "Is there any particular number of people required for this plan?" and responded: "Yes, Four 
is the only number of people that will make this plan work."
Experiment 4: Memory Test
Experiments 1-3 indicated that people could acquire a schema by generalizing the explanation 
of a single example: however, they did not indicate when generalization occurred. The subjects 
might have performed schema abstraction at the time they read the passage or only later when 
asked questions about it. For example, in Experiment 3, subjects in the Example group might have 
answered the questions by storing specific representations of the narratives in memory and then 
generalizing these representations after they were asked the questions. If this is the case, they 
should also be able to answer questions about specific facts in the narratives as well as questions 
about the general schemata.
Schema Acquisition from One Example
Method
We tested subjects' memory for specific and general information one day after they read an 
experimental narrative. To test general information, we used the same questions from Experiment 
3. including both questions on constraints and on variables. To test specific information, we 
developed new yes/no questions on each constraint and variable instantiated in the example. For 
example, to test the variable, "number of participants", we asked. "Were there five people in the 
group described?".
Subjects read only one of the three narratives and were asked to rate the quality and useful­
ness of the plan. They then left without knowing that there would be more tests related to what 
they had read. After one day. subjects returned expecting another experiment. Instead, each subject 
received questions on the narratives they had read previously and were asked to answer them with 
"yes" or "no" at their own pace. There were 17 subjects in total.
r
Results and Discussion
The percentage correct for general questions was 84% whereas that for specific questions was 
only 60%. These results indicate that subjects’ responses to general questions were based on their 
general schemata not on specific representations of the narratives. This is because the hypothesis 
that the subjects were using a specific representation to answer the questions requires that the sub­
ject retrieve the specific information relevant for each abstracts question. Also, since they were not 
aware that there would be a comprehension test one day later, these data provide evidence that the 
general schemata were a natural product of the comprehension process.
Conclusions
In general, the experiments described above support EBL as a viable psychological model of 
certain types of human learning. Specifically, they demonstrate that, like GENESIS, people can 
learn a schema by generalizing the explanation of a single narrative.
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Previous research has generally assumed that multiple examples are required for schema or 
concept acquisition. For example, Rumelhart and Norman (1978) claimed that there are basically 
two ways in which schemata can be formed. These were pattern generation and schema induction 
both of which require exposure to multiple examples. Brewer and Nakamura (1984), postulating 
schemata as containing abstract generic knowledge, also assumed that schema acquisition required 
multiple examples.
Gick and Holyoak (1983) even specifically showed that subjects could not learn a particular 
schema (the “convergence schema” ) from a single example and that acquiring the schema required 
two analogous examples. However, the convergence schema is a very abstract concept which a 
standard EBL mechanism could not acquire from one example. Explanation-based generalization as 
performed by GENESIS involves retaining the basic structure of the plan used in a specific example 
and removing actions, properties, and relations which are clearly irrelevant to achieving the goal. 
Given a story like The General” from Gick and Holyoak (1983), such a process would acquire a 
schema for capturing an enemy fortress by attacking it simultaneously from all sides; however, it 
could not acquire an extremely abstract concept like the convergence schema. Consequently, the 
results presented here do not contradict the specific results or conclusions presented in Gick and 
Holyoak (1983). However, our results do show that there is a large class of schemata that can be 
acquired from one example.
Although explanation-based learning can be used to learn a schema from only one example, it 
is unsuitable for learning certain classes of concepts. EBL is only applicable when one has sufficient 
knowledge of the domain and the schema to be learned is solely determined by causal constraints. 
In this case, people use their existing knowledge of the domain to guide the schema acquisition pro­
cess and distinguish relevant from irrelevant features after given only one example. This improves 
the efficiency of learning and results in schemata which are free from spurious correlations. How­
ever, many schemata, such as that for a wedding ceremony or a birthday party, are determined by 
un-explainable social conventions as well as by necessary causal relationships among their consti-
- l l -
Schema Acquisition from One Example
tuent actions. Learning such schemata efficiently will require a mechanism which successfully 
integrates the different approaches underlying current learning mechanisms.
Nevertheless, EBL is one of the first attempts to incorporate significant amounts of causal and 
explanatory domain knowledge into a learning mechanism. Murphy and Medin (1985) argue per­
suasively for the importance of "theories” in concept formation, where important features of a 
"theory” include "An explanatory principle common to category members" and a "Network 
formed by causal and explanatory links.” Investigating explanation-based learning from a single 
example represents an important step in understanding how "theories” can be successfully 
employed in concept acquisition.
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